UIHistories Project: A History of the University of Illinois by Kalev Leetaru
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Repository: UIHistories Project: Booklet - UI Charter of Freedom (1942) [PAGE 63]

Caption: Booklet - UI Charter of Freedom (1942)
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62

officers. (Laws of 1826, p. 88.) On February 7, 1835, an act took effect giving the Auditor and Treasurer authority and making it their duty to settle the accounts "of the several attorneys," inter alia, for the Bank, allow them their reasonable charges and contingent expenses, and if there was anything due the Bank from them for moneys they collected, it was made the duty of the Treasurer to direct the Attorney General, or proper State's attorney, "to commence suit against all such delinquents without delay." (Laws of 1835, pp. 59, 60.) During the biennium 1832-34 the Auditor paid W. B. Scates S50.00 "for legal services in three cases against Jos. M. Duncan, late Cashier" (of the Bank). (Laws of Illinois, 1835, Auditor's Report, p. 246.) The claims were of course claims of the Bank against Duncan. The reports of the Supreme Court of this State show that the Bank was often represented by counsel of its own selection—counsel other than the Attorney General under the grant of power to sue and liability to suit. [See State Bank v. Rain (1823), Ernst, etc. v. State Bank (1824), State Bank v. Buckmaster (1826», and State Bank v. Moreland (1828), reported in 1 Breese. 75, 86, 176 and 282, respectively.] The authorities, then, clearly support the proposition that unless statutes otherwise provide, a public corporation hold and transfer property, to make rules for the government of the agencies under its control, to create trust and issue bonds, and which is liable to suit, has the implied power to employ counsel in connection with it corporate activities, and the Attorney General i not the exclusive legal adviser to such an entity. As a matter of fact, all the cases clearly reco ni. < that the principle of corporate entity is here of controlling importance. They recognize that such a bodv