Repository: UIHistories Project: Convocation - 1942 Winter-Spring [PAGE 37]

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night not, in the long run. 1 best to let Germany gi littl stronger. Then their would be a fine buh irk in 1 Eui nst the nasty I hevik Perhaps Hitler could be maneuv< ed u< quarrel with Russia; perhaps the tw untri would dev h other in a long and exhausting war. iVrhaj the fanatical im erialism ( jrmany could be turned a linst the fanatical cl; iousn< i the Soviets and the tw isms would fight a tinst each ther until they became wasms!

Hitler and the Nazis were quick to pre home this j int. Reall) n the level, they were building their strength to save the world fn m Bolshevism, They should be left alone. Besides, as secret pr gandists cleverly sm ted, what was there to fear from Germany. It was a "have not" < untry, with a flimsy economic structure, F w« = scarce, raw material.- were rare. Everything was "ei itz." mad • 51 stituU iood, clothing, shelter. The propaganda disarmed th Allied leaders. When stories filtered out that some kind of rearmin was g tin n, they dismissed them as exa rated. And even if t n u here was no danger to England or France. German arm- would neve used against \ werful, wealthy countries like England and France ut most likely a tinst the Bolsheviks. In 1936 Hitler was read}- and he struck—hard. His legi ns invaded Austria and took it over bloodlessly. There was a brief crisis in France tnd England, but it was decided to take no retaliatory action. Perhap Hitler was right, the \llied leaders argued. Tin. Vustrians are German, md this is reall} an Anschluss, a union of peoples who belong t gether. < Hitler digest 1 Austria, destroying all of its remaining democrat! machinery, liquidating all enemies, and then began terrorizing other parts of Central Europe and the Balkans. In 1938 came the great Czech crisis, and Hitler insisted upon dismembering its m st imp< tar. : military parts. Chamberlain fumed and fussed and insisted that would be morally wrong. He wondered whether a few personal cor. •n< s would not let Hitler se< >w unethical it was to settle inter

national problems by fore

He flew to Berchtesgaden, and to Godes

berg, and finally I Munich, to reason with Hitler. He worked on the principl that "if at first you don't concede, fly, fly again." Hitk irmed and threaten 1 and played on the fears iM' Chamberlain th war would unsettle- th status quo. He persuaded Chamberlain that the C/ h demand was the last territorial demand he would ever make Chamberlain capitulat 1. "He came, he saw. he c o n c u r r e d . " The

British lion, • marked the Nation, had In ome the line of least n tana One opp< iti<>n meml r o\ Parliament kept whistling

ion Bridg< llin; imvn."

Now th( at 1 stion on the other side oi German) had fallei [• m < uld no Ion count upon a powerful Balkan Entente, Russia, snubbed all throi the crisis, rtain that the whoh purpose i \ll i