Repository: UIHistories Project: Board of Trustees Minutes - 1916 [PAGE 771]

EXTRACTED TEXT FROM PAGE:

1915]

PROCEEDINGS OP THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES.

771

On the 19th of December, 1913, the administrator filed statement with the Industrial Board, which body notified the University and requested it to name a representative on the Committee of Arbitration. I appeared before the board and insisted that it had not jurisdiction of the case for the reason that the University had never elected to come within the provisions of the act. I declined to name a representative. Thereupon the board named Peter D. Carey as the representative of the University on the Board of Arbitration. The law provides that the Arbitrating Committee shall be named in the manner following: one member of the Industrial Board, one member to be selected by the injured employee, and one by the employer. After being notified of the selection of Carey the case was set for hearing on March 17, 1914. I appeared on that day, but the case was not tried because of the absence of the attorney for the administrator. After two or three continuations, the trial was commenced on the 25th of June. Before the case was tried I filed a protest against a hearing, and a motion to dismiss for the following reasons: (1) That the Workmen's Compensation Act did not apply to the University; (2) that the University had never elected to pay compensation as provided by the first section of the act; and (3) that it was not engaged in any of the occupations, enterprises, or businesses enumerated in paragraph (b) of section 3 of the act. There was no controversy as to the manner in which North met his death, and it was admitted by the University that he was in its employ at the time, but we made it clear by the testimony of Mr. Abbott that the University was not engaged in either of the eight lines of employment mentioned above, except as incidental to its business of furnishing instruction and education to students. We made it clear that it was doing none of those things in a commercial sense, and while it did handle some dangerous agencies, it did so only as it was necessary to fulfill its mission of education. On the 29th of June, 1914, the Arbitrating Committee made its report, holding that the administrator of North's estate was entitled to receive from the Board of Trustees the sum of $8.75 per week, for a period of 384 weeks from the 5th day of December, 1913. At a hearing before the Industrial Board, the decision of the committee was approved. Paragraph (f) of section 19 of the act provides that the Supreme Court shall have power to review the questions of law involved in a decision of the Industrial Board by certiorari or mandamus. Under this section we applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but the same was subsequently dismissed, the Supreme Court holding that the provision for review by the Supreme Court was unconstitutional. We were forced, therefore, to sue out a writ of certiorari from the Circuit Court of Cook County, and the entire case before the Arbitration Committee and Industrial Board was presented before that court. The Circuit Court declined to quash the proceedings and we were compelled to prosecute an appeal to the Appellate Court, where the case is now pending. In the printed brief we have filed before the Appellate Court, we contend: I. "The Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913 does not apply to the University of Illinois and, therefore, the Industrial Board of Illinois is without jurisdiction in the premises." II. "'The University has never elected to provide compensation for accidental injuries to employees according to the act." III. "The University is not engaged in any of the occupations, enterprises, or businesses enumerated in paragraph (b) of section 3 of the act." Under the first point of contention, we insist that the term "employment" should be constructed as excluding the Board of Trustees of the University, and cite as authorities Agler v. Michigan Agricultural College, 5 N. C. C. A., 897. We also cite Weinberg v. The Regents of University, 97 Mich., 246, and Sterling v. Regents of University, 110 Mich., 369, in support of the view that "state," as used in section 4 of the act, cannot be construed so as to include a state university operating under a special charter. We are supported in our second contention by Millar v. Pillsbury, 164 Calif., 199. Of course, there are no authorities to be cited under our third contention. As to the other matter concerning which you desired my views, I will say that I do not think it would be wise for the Board of Trustees to establish a fixed rate of-compensation for employees, but that each case should be dealt with separately. I can see no objection to the Board of Trustees continuing an injured man in its service, although he may be badly disabled, at such compensation as may be agreed upon, even though such a man would not be employed in the first instance. I can see no objection to the University providing medical attention, nursing, and support during such time as he may be confined. When the Supreme Court shall pronounce its views in the North case, then we will have a better understanding of what action it is wise to take. I am inclined to the opinion that if the Supreme Court holds we are within the provisions of the act, that we should either file our election to come within its provisions, or take insurance for all employees. Respectfully submitted,

No action was taken concerning this matter.

CASE OF MR. E. C. LEWIS.

O. A. HARKER.

(8) Mr. E. C. Lewis received an injury while in the employ of the University, about January 21, 1915. One of the workmen while on a platform in the power plant dropped a crowbar, hitting Mr. Lewis on the right shoulder. Two weeks' sick leave on half time was allowed Mr. Lewis.